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Middle Eastern Minorities in Global Media  






Since the Arab uprisings began in 2010, some communities have experienced increased levels of 
violence or insecurity on the basis of their ethnic, religious, or linguistic identity. This article 
examines how such communities have mobilized and developed their media strategies in order to 
protect themselves and adapt to their changing circumstances. Through investigating the cases of 
Coptic Christians in Egypt and Ezidis in Iraq, this article demonstrates that both of these 
communities have begun to connect their community interests with international political 
concerns and narratives through engaging with global media. Recent scholarship on indigenous 
media shows globalizing trends in media production and consumption have led indigenous media 
to increasingly tap into both national and global media to support their advocacy.  In my case 
studies, the move to engage global media has particularly flourished since 2014 but the emphasis 
is on direct engagement with international political discourses through global media. Most notable 
is the mobilization of a campaign to recognize violence against Christians and Ezidis in the Middle 
East as genocide.  The aims in engaging the international level differ between the Coptic and Ezidi 
cases. For Copts, there is a balance between raising the profile of violence against Copts in global 
media while employing narratives that support Egyptian state policies and strengthen pre-existing 
Coptic discourses of national belonging.  Ezidi diaspora activists seek international protection and 
potentially an autonomous area in Iraq. This article argues that the differences in the terms and 
aims of global media engagement stem partly from the way the community perceives its status 
within the home nation, particularly with regards the notion of being a minority, as well as 
experiences of national belonging. 
 
Introduction 
Some scholars have described the post-2011 period and the emergence of the Arab uprisings as 
leading to a climate of revived or ‘new sectarianism.’ (Hinnebusch 2016; al-Rasheed 2011) While 
this has given rise to scholarship that seeks to analyze the causes and effects of this issue, there 
has been less of a focus on the ways in which different communities are responding to increased 
violence or persecution and how this connects to potential changes in their identity politics.  In 
this article, I suggest that minorities/marginalized communities are increasingly seeking to intersect 
their concerns with global media flows and with the discourses of international political and 
international civil society, (Appadurai 1996; 2000) and this is leading to shifts in the ‘politics and 
poetics of representation.’ (Ginsburg 1991: 93) Two of the driving forces of this are the 
development of new media technologies, especially in the diaspora, and local political pressures 
introduced into the Middle East since 2011. Together these provide means and motive for the 
construction of a new global media imperative.  
 
In this article, the case studies adopted are Coptic Orthodox Christians of Egypt and the Ezidis 
(also known as Yazidis or Yezidis) of Iraq.  Both have been subject to violence as part of the 
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upheaval experienced since 2011. However, they represent very different cases in terms of their 
history and politics within their respective nations and involvement in national politics and the 
public sphere. While Coptic and Ezidi media in the home nations generally remain particularistic 
and focused on serving the social and cultural needs of the communities, community leaders in 
the diaspora are increasingly engaging with media and audiences outside of their communities to 
highlight the ways that the challenges faced by the community intersect with global issues.  This is 
in line with recent research on global media and indigenous media, which suggests that 
communities ‘often directly address the politics of identity and representation by engaging and 
challenging the dominant political forms at both the national and international level.’ (Wilson and 
Stewart, 2008: 5)   
 
While there has been a parallel development among both communities in terms of engagement in 
international rights discourses, the background to this shift, and the aims in undertaking it, differ 
between them. The differences between these case studies stem partly from the way the 
community perceives its status within the home nation, particularly with regards the notion of 
being a minority, and the extent and form of marginalization experienced in the national public 
space.  I also suggest that this partly explains the different aims of the two communities in seeking 
to engage similar discourses of anti-terrorism and, most notably, genocide. I suggest that 2013 for 
the Copts and 2014 for the Ezidis represent the key turning point in terms of investigating changes 
in the identity politics of these case studies. The attacks on churches in Egypt following 
Mohammed Morsi’s ouster in July 2013 and the attacks on Ezidis that began in August 2014 
introduced a severe escalation in the level of threat experienced. As a result, both communities 
began to adopt and promote narratives that their protection is a global issue and not simply a 
localized or national one.  From this point onwards, there is a greater concern to be pro-active in 
representing the community and its concerns globally as part of international concerns, for 
example on issues of human rights, acts of genocide or supporting democratization in the face of 
the threat of terrorism.  This article examines the evolution of Coptic and Ezidi media strategies 
from a focus on particularistic media within the nation and diasporic communities, to strategies 
for engaging in global media flows. 
 
The Dilemmas of Particularistic Media Usage: The Coptic and Ezidi Case Studies 
Research on different forms of ethnic and minority media describes the construction of alternative 
media spaces that are seen as a crucial tool and space for the formation, negotiation and 
performance of alternatives identities.  Since they are ‘different’ and ‘alternative’, this implies a 
binary of comparison with a ‘normal’ or ‘mainstream’ media sphere that does not incorporate or 
accurately represent all those within specific boundaries.  Adopting a community media strategy is 
central to surviving pressures of assimilation and discrimination if it contributes to providing a 
space for the performance of identities otherwise excluded from the mainstream of public national 
media. As Riggins (1992: 3) argues, ‘What better strategy could there be for ensuring minority 
survival than the development by minorities of their own media conveying their own point of view 
in their own language?’  From this perspective, media is seen as compensatory and complementary. 
It is also particularistic. 
 
According to Cottle, (2000: 24-5) one of the key functions of such alternative particularistic media 
is to compensate for gaps in mainstream media, while it can also act as a defense against 
underrepresentation or misrepresentation. (Caspi and Elias 2014: 11, 220) Both aspects focus on 
the community within its national context because it is within this national framework that the 
minority/majority or empowered/disempowered dialectic takes on meaning.  Iskander (2012a: 57-
9) describes in detail how particularistic Coptic media has acted as an alternative space to the 
national public sphere since Coptic visibility in the public sphere declined from the 1950s onwards. 
This separate autonomous space enabled the community to construct its identity and socialize 
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members into the community through platforms and narratives controlled by the community. 
(Ramzy 2016: 439) Coptic journalists argue that this can support the empowering of communities 
that perceive themselves to be the victims of inaccuracy and bias in national media.i This was 
supported by surveys of Coptic Christians both in Egypt and the diaspora that I carried out 
between 2007-2009. The main concern that emerged regarding Coptic community media was to 
empower the community members and to preserve an identity that is perceived as threatened and 
excluded from national life.  
 
Despite this apparent enthusiasm for such media, Riggins (1992: 77) nevertheless acknowledges 
that using particularistic media to compensate for a community’s lack of access to national public 
sphere can lead to an enhancement of their marginalization.  This is also reflected in Iskander’s 
(2012a; 2012b) work on Coptic Christian media in Egypt prior to 2011.  This research found that 
too much emphasis on particularistic media potentially reduces the knowledge about the 
marginalized community in the public consciousness and so communities do need to balance the 
use of media for particularistic audiences with efforts to maintain visibility in mainstream media if 
they are to avoid enhancing isolating effects.   Indeed, while Copts acknowledge the value and 
necessity of community media, concerns were also voiced through surveys and interviews 
conducted by the author with Coptic audiences and Coptic media producers over the past decade. 
These indicated that Copts should not use this to isolate themselves but only to empower 
themselves as citizens.   
 
This point was particularly raised by Yousef Sidhom, the editor of Watani, the only Coptic-run 
newspaper that is widely and publicly available in Egypt.  He believes that Watani’s mission is to 
emphasize that Copts are Egyptian citizens and to ensure that Watani is visible in the national 
public space because if Coptic media focuses only on acting as an alternative space it has less 
intersections with national and international media that can lead to the reduction of knowledge 
and visibility of a community in the national public sphere.ii  In the case of Watani, although the 
editor believes there is a small Muslim readership and the newspaper is indeed available outside of 
the church space, the paper’s readership and content does remain heavily community-focused. 
The focus on Coptic affairs then reduces its appeal to audiences outside the community. This is a 
common characteristic of particularistic media leading to a dilemma of reducing community-
focused content, which can lead to assimilation with the mainstream, or maintaining a community-
focus but then enhancing separation from the national audience. (Riggins 1992: 14-15) It creates 
the dilemma of community media in that by providing for a community’s specific needs it 
potentially leads to further marginalization and differentiation, as demonstrated by research on 
Aboriginal media in Australia. (Riggins, 1992: 77) Dayan’s (1998) work on particularistic media 
also supports the argument that it is internally cohesive but encourages remoteness from society 
at large.   
 
This is only problematic if the community is seeking to use community media as the primary 
mechanism to encourage greater integration or to advocate for greater inclusion at the national 
level. In general, particularistic media has not aimed to serve this function for either Copts or 
Ezidis but rather it serves an internal audience. This is not to say that there are no Copts or Ezidis 
appearing in national media. Individual journalists and activists from both communities do 
participate in the national public sphere. But in terms of media produced by Copts and Ezidis 
from their community viewpoint, this has minimal visibility in the contemporary mainstream 
media scenes of Egypt or Iraq.  
 
For Copts, the function of Coptic-produced media is largely to support the religious aspect of 
Coptic identity that is not served by the public sphere, whereas for the purpose of empowering 
national belonging discourses, Copts draw largely on national public discourses that are historically 
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entrenched at the national level.  This mainly focuses on the national unity symbolism of ‘cross 
and crescent’ that is rooted in the commemoration of the 1919 Revolution. (Iskander 2012b: 34; 
Ibrahim 2010) Particularistic media forms a function that is separate yet intertwined with Coptic 
Egyptian identity, with careful avoidance in both official public media and Coptic particularistic 
media of narratives that would contradict al-Wahda al-Wataniya. In fact, the imagery and language 
of Coptic media reinforces the integral part that the Egyptian homeland symbolizes for Coptic 
identity. (Iskander 2012a: 11-16, 48-55)  One example of an image that draws the aspects of Coptic 
identity together, and that can frequently be seen in Coptic media, is the image of the Holy Family 
in exile in Egypt with the pyramids of Giza in the background. 
 
In the case of Ezidis, the aim of their pre-2014 particularistic media was generally not to increase 
community visibility at the national level. The Ezidis of Iraq had not placed significant emphasis 
on media prior to the crisis that began with the invasion of their traditional territories in northern 
Iraq in August 2014 and the community media that did exist prior to this was mainly used within 
the community to circulate Ezidi culture and support education. However, this was limited in 
significance in part, according to an Ezidi NGO, due to the Ezidi tradition of preserving their faith 
and traditions orally.iii  Furthermore, a broad and well-developed media network was less crucial 
because the Ezidis, unlike Copts, are a compact community, meaning they are largely concentrated 
in one area of Iraq. Ezidi culture is largely centered around northern Iraq and this focus is 
demonstrated in the use of the name Lalish for many media platforms in reference to the town of 
Lalish which is the spiritual center for Ezidis and a place of pilgrimage. As well as this and frequent 
use of the peacock image, a symbol of Ezidi religion, there is also frequent use of the Ezidi flag 
visible, especially in the post-2014 surge in Ezidi media.  
 
The symbolism and imagery of Ezidi media then often reinforces both the religious and the ethnic 
differences between Ezidi Iraqis and Iraqis belonging to non-Ezidi communities.  Both ethnic and 
religious aspects are important to Ezidi identity politics. Diaspora activists frequently refer to 
tensions within the community regarding the labelling of Ezidis as ethnically Kurdish and many 
often refer to 74 historical genocides and to  discrimination that Ezidis have historically 
experienced, which they explain as resulting from the Ezidi religion not being one that is 
recognized by Islam.iv This is in contrast to Christians and Jews who are recognized as People of 
the Book (Ahl al-Kitab), a status which sets up rules of cooperation and protection between them 
and Muslims. (Maisel 2013: 34) As a result of their uncertain status, both in terms of ethnicity and 
of religion, the Ezidis as a community have generally preferred to keep a low profile within the 
Iraqi nation to avoid conflict. Tensions have increased though since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 
and with the increasingly assertive Kurdish regional Government (KRG), which is also based in 
northern Iraq.v  Consequently, Ezidi journalists and activists suggest that while developing a strong 
media sector was not a focus for the community before the 2003 it has become increasingly vitalvi.   
 
The other use of Ezidi media has been to contribute to negotiating the community’s political status 
vis-a-vis the KRG. For example, while Ezidis have a television channel, Merkez Lalish, this is seen 
by some Ezidi activists and journalists as linked to the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP).vii  This 
trend seems to be mirrored by the experiences of Ezidis in Syria according to Maisel. (2016: 5)  
Several of the Ezidi media professionals and activists I interviewed described how some of the 
Ezidi media that was available was overseen by the national government or by the KRG, who co-
opted it for their own political projects.viii Consequently, Ezidis often lacked media platforms that 
were truly their own spaces for free self-expression of their identity. This lack of a well-developed 
and autonomous media sector, the sense of distance from the national government in Baghdad 
relative to the dominant role in the local politics of Ezidi towns by the KRG, and the prevailing 
sense of differences between the different communities that make up the Iraqi nation, have all 
contributed to the context in which Ezidi media post-2014 began to rapidly develop. 
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Particularistic Media, Global Media, and the Nation 
Both scholarship and the experiences of the two case studies briefly described above demonstrate 
that the function of filling a compensatory need to support a community and preserve its identity 
and culture can often be the primary function of a community’s media. However, the pressures of 
globalization, along with socio-political change and migration, have led to changes to the needs of 
audiences of community media, as well as to general media practices and the relationship between 
media producers and consumers. As Deuze (2006: 262) argues, the apparent success of community 
media must be viewed within the context of ‘the worldwide emergence of all kinds of community, 
alternative, oppositional, participatory and collaborative media practices, in part amplified by the 
internet.’ The growth of social media represents perhaps one of the biggest developments in the 
way we create and consume media and is being increasingly adopted by activists. (Obar, Zube and 
Lampe 2012)  Both Coptic and Ezidi media have developed its presence in social media in order 
to support networks within the community, as well as to link community concerns into global 
media conversations.  For example, the hashtag #CopticLivesMatter quickly appeared on Twitter 
in May 2017 after an attack on a bus of Coptic pilgrims.   
 
There is insufficient space in this article to fully unpack the relationship between media and 
globalization and the complexity of its effects. However, in an increasingly globalized world 
connected by new media and experiencing waves of displaced peoples, the contemporary meaning 
of borders and relations between the global and the local are becoming of interest to many 
different academic disciplines.  This also raises questions about the operation of particularistic 
media and if, or how, it is changing in this climate.  Recent scholarship on global indigenous media 
has addressed many of these issues. As Wilson and Stewart (2008: 18) argue that: ‘In the context 
of globalization and the rise of international indigenism of the last two decades, the use and 
mobilization of media have become increasingly central at all levels of organization: local, national 
and inter or transnational.’ Scholars of this media acknowledge that defining what constitutes 
indigenous media as a category in today's global cultural politics is problematic, leading Alia (2010: 
14) to argue that there is a consensus among scholars and activists not to define indigeneity but to 
focus instead on defining and protecting rights.  However, this literature draws on decades of rich 
qualitative research into the cultural anthropology of the media that is instructive in examining the 
contemporary Coptic and Ezidi cases.  Therefore, although I hesitate to apply the term indigenous 
to Coptic and Ezidi media, there are instructive commonalities in the literature on global 
indigenous media.   
  
There are also subtle differences. Wilson and Stewart (2008: 2) identify a shift in the 2000s during 
which locally based indigenous media production has ‘become part of globally linked media 
networks with increased effectiveness and reach.’ They suggest that this evolved in reaction to the 
development of rights discourses in the post-World War II period and often revolved around 
advocacy for land returns. This shift has not been as straightforward in the Coptic and Ezidi case 
studies but has become much more visible and developed only in recent years. I suggest that it is 
the extreme circumstances, introduced into the region by a surge in violence and insecurity, have 
instead necessitated this recent, rapid move focused towards the international.  This is not entirely 
exceptional. Brooten’s (2008) chapter on Burma in the Wilson and Stewart volume suggests that 
indigenous peoples are sometimes forced to bypass the nation state when the situation requires 
visibility and protection at the international level.   
 
It is my contention that the previous weaknesses in Coptic and Ezidi media engagement at the 
national and international levels was informed by political and historical factors, particularly those 
related to the evolution of nationalist movements in Egypt and Iraq during the post-World War I 
colonial period that has shaped the relationships between communities and attitudes to the term 
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minority. Whereas Copts have a central narrative of belonging to the Egyptian nation and 
vehemently deny the minority label as undermining their understanding of the way Coptic and 
Egyptian identity are intertwined,ix Ezidi activists tend to have less of a negative relationship with 
the term minority.x  For Copts, protection has been sought through promoting ideas of national 
unity and citizenship, emphasizing the Coptic heritage of Egypt and, in recent decades, promoting 
a 'pact' for mutual support between church and political authorities. (Tadros 2009, 2013; McCallum 
2010; Iskander 2012a, 2012b; Makari 2007) In contrast, Ezidis see themselves as both an ethnically 
and religiously distinct people within a state made up of a number of distinct nations or 
components (qawmiyat or makowwanat).  This stems from the different context of the emergence 
of the Iraqi nation, as it consists of many diverse communities with different religious, ethnic, and 
linguistic identities.  
 
In Egypt, the term ‘minority’ is particularly poisonous for the sacred national unity narrative. For 
Egyptian Christians, the label minority negates the indigeneity that forms an inseparable aspect of 
constructions of “Copticness,” (Iskander 2012a) it also undermines the strong contribution made 
by Christians in the nationalist movement, especially through the Wafd Party. This is summed up 
by the stance of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Egypt. Coptic Patriarch Tawadros I said in an 
interview in 2013: ‘Yes, we are a minority in the numerical sense, but we are not a minority when 
it comes to value, history, interaction, and love for our nation.’xi   Furthermore, the term minority 
undermines the public discourse of unity between Muslims and Christians that forms a well-
entrenched narrative across Egyptian society. Finally, it is associated with the colonial period and 
foreign intervention. When Britain declared Egypt’s independence in 1922, a list of principles was 
issued to protect British interests in Egypt, including the right to intervene to protect minorities 
and foreign interests. Egyptian nationalists, including Christians, strongly rejected the need for any 
protection and rejected the term “minority.”  In the eventual Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 no 
mention was made of minorities. There was also an objection to the proposal of giving reserved 
seats in parliament to Copts or special ‘minority’ rights in the constitution of 1923.  Instead article 
3 enshrines equality, with no discrimination on the basis of origin, language or religion.    
 
Similarly, in Iraq, laws enshrine equality among citizens. Iraq’s first constitution mentioned the 
term minority in Article 37, referring to the need to secure representation of non-Muslims in 
parliament.  The requirement of guaranteeing minority rights was a central issue for mandate 
countries in seeking to gain independence. This is the only use of the term however, and Article 
18 states that all Iraqis are equal in status. In the current constitution, drafted in 2005, the word 
minority is not used at all. The different groups are described as nations or components of Iraq, 
and each is given full freedom and equality in law.  
 
Nevertheless, marginalization and sectarianism were not eliminated in either Egypt or Iraq by such 
legal provisions. (Ali and Hanna 2002: 116) It is beyond the scope of this article to detail the forms 
this has taken historically but there is a plethora of recent scholarship that does examine the 
processes that have (re)produced minoritization, sectarianism and the exclusion of certain 
communities from public culture and national identity discourses (for example Haddad 2011; 
Iskander 2012a; Matthiesen 2015; Kymlicka and Pfostl 2014).  While legal culture and political 
speech has sought to eliminate differences between communities, the everyday experiences of 
marginalization and discrimination are a reality for many different communities. Developing 
particularistic media has been one expression of community responses to this. I suggest that in the 
case of the Copts, concerns about accusations of betrayal of Egypt prevent explicit advocacy at 
the national level and lead to a degree of self-censorship in Coptic media.  In the Ezidi case, the 
entrenched sense of separation between the community and the national political regime has 
created a gap in trust and confidence in the ability or will of the nation to accept increased Ezidi 
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activism at the national level. Consequently, in the past much of the Ezidi community media in 
Iraq tended to be inward-facing and not nation-facing. 
 
Developments in Coptic and Ezidi Diasporic Media  
This inward-facing tendency within the national context in Egypt and Iraq has of course been 
affected by relations with the development of Coptic and Ezidi diasporas. The advent of new 
media technologies has also contributed to shifts in the way both communities employ 
particularistic media.  It is not the intention here to theorize the impact of globalization on 
diasporic media but its central to understand the flows of media between the local and global in 
the Coptic and Ezidi examples in order to understand the role now being played by diasporas in 
global media engagement. 
 
I. Coptic Diaspora Media 
Copts have a diaspora that has been well established since the 1960s in Europe, America, Canada 
and Australia (Saad 2010).  While the growth of these diasporic communities and the development 
of new media technologies have given an increased ability to those outside of traditional 
community leadership (usually from the church hierarchy) to the means for producing Coptic 
media, questions remain about the impact of media produced outside the community’s official 
leadership. (Iskander 2012a) Riggins (1992) suggests that new forms of media can be used to 
bypass traditional leadership but Iskander voices caution about overestimating electronic media’s 
ability to bypass community authority and leaders, suggesting that community media is often used 
to affirm traditional structures as a way of preserving identity or balance assimilation in local 
societies with building ties with the homeland.  In the Coptic case, the main Coptic satellite 
channels are operated by the Coptic Church, which has also developed an influential online 
presence.  The Coptic Church is central to socializing Copts into the community in the diaspora 
as it is in Egypt and the church has embraced media to support this function. (Brinkerhoff 2015; 
Armanious and Amstutz 2013; Saad and Westbrook 2017) 
 
However, the new reality presented by online media is having an impact by necessitating the 
adoption of new technology among the traditional leadership and the trend towards participatory 
engagement with media.  In mass media, the audience is a passive consumer, but through new 
media, especially social media, there is increased space for interaction. (Shirky 2011; 29) Media 
platforms are therefore not only places where identity is transmitted but also where identity is 
(re)negotiated and expressed beyond local limitations imposed on communities. (Jones 1998: 63) 
According to Couldry and Dreher (2007: 84) ‘These allow for collective conversations both within 
and beyond nation-states and the formation of hybrid identities.’ 
 
Online media engages with audiences differently (Georgiou, 82-3: 2013) because it has made the 
border between audiences more porous and blurred lines between audiences and producers.  This 
has also overcome restrictions occurring in the national context. Whereas a church publication in 
Egypt might have been only available inside the bookshop of a specific church in the past, now it 
is accessible to anyone with an interest and an internet connection According to Armanious and 
Amstutz (2013: 514) Coptic films have been made for decades but ‘For years and ostensibly until 
the present, the Egyptian government restricted their circulation to churches.’  Despite this kind 
of limitation in the national context, the films are sold in churches globally and are now increasingly 
accessible through satellite television and the Internet.  These developments mean that not only 
Copts access such material more easily through bypassing boundaries imposed by the state but 
also the material is available to audiences outside the community.  In this way, Coptic media has 
become part of a globalized flow of identity-based media.  As a result, ‘For the first time, Coptic 
concerns, issues, and religious life have become available to all subscribers of major satellite carriers 
throughout the region and internationally.’ (Armanious and Amstutz 2013: 514) 
Arab Media & Society (Issue 24, Summer/Fall 2017) 
Minorities in Global Media 8 
 
Online media has also enabled diasporas to become more “networked” into the affairs of the 
community in the homeland. This does not mean that the involvement of diasporas in the politics 
of the homeland is always welcomed.  The Copts have often had an uncomfortable relationship 
with Coptic diaspora activists, (Iskander 2012b) which relates to the question of whether Copts 
are a minority in the nation or whether they need outside protection.  The official Church line 
within Egypt has often been that there is no persecution and that Copts are an integral part of the 
national fabric of Egypt.xii  The diaspora activists that stepped over the line vis-à-vis the official 
stance were attacked in Egyptian media, as part of supporting the argument that Copts do not 
need outside interference and that their protection is secured within the nation as citizens.  In the 
1990s and 2000s, some Coptic activists in the diaspora tried to mobilize a human rights discourse 
of minority protection, often leading them to step outside the “official” community media sphere 
led by the church.  This conflict with prevailing community discourses led to conflict and often 
reduced their legitimacy as spokespeople within the community.  These diaspora Copts were not 
only rejected as Copts but also as Egyptians (one and the same in the national unity discourse of 
both state and church). This ensured that diaspora media remained largely produced by traditional 
community leaders, mainly from the church, and existed largely to serve the religious and cultural 
needs of the local community as well as to link it to the transnational, but still particularistic, Coptic 
media community. 
 
II. Ezidi Diaspora Media 
Ezidi diasporic media presents a different trajectory with regards to its development and its 
gatekeepers. The Ezidi diaspora has grown rapidly since 2014 and it is suggested that after this 
around 15 per cent of the Ezidi population fled to try to join the pre-existing diaspora in Germany, 
the UK, America and Canada. (Marr and al-Marashi 2017) However, before this it was relatively 
small. According to Yezidis International, a US-based NGO, the vast majority of Ezidis live in 
Iraq around Mosul and Sinjar in the north.  They estimate that the population is around 500,000. 
Outside of Iraq, probably the largest community is in Armenia, where there is an estimated 40,000 
Ezidis.  Historically there was a large community in Turkey but it is thought that most have 
emigrated to Germany where there is thought to be approximately 30,000 Ezidis concentrated in 
the western states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony. Emigration rates from Iraq 
increased after the 2003 war with many joining the diaspora in Germany and since 2008 there has 
been a growing Ezidi community established in Sweden, numbering an estimated 10, 000. There 
are much smaller communities based in the UK, US, Canada, Belgium, France and others but they 
are all probably less than 5000 people.xiii  Yezidis International put the total population of Ezidis 
at around 700, 000 to one million but claim this  is decreasing due to the violence since 2014.xiv  
 
The NGO Yezidis International has expressed concerns that even if Ezidis can survive the 
brutality of IS and the political situation in Iraq, the dispersal of Ezidis worldwide could lead to 
the disappearance of their culture if the community continues to rely only on the oral tradition to 
preserve its identity.xv  Community media has thus quickly had to establish transnational networks 
to strengthen links and resources for Ezidis.  The largest community is based in Germany where 
EzidiPress was established in 2013 as a blog for the purpose of empowering Ezidi youth with a 
sense of confidence in their history and identity.xvi  Shortly after this and with the outbreak of 
violence in Iraq EzidiPress expanded as the need for community solidarity grew. Ezidis from 
Turkey, Syria, Russia, Georgia and Armenia joined EzidiPress to establish a multilingual news site 
in order to reach the various Ezidi diaspora groups and to raise awareness about what was 
happening in Sinjar.  To reach as wide an audience as possible EzidiPress began to publish in six 
languages: German, English, Kurmanji, Russian, French, and Arabic. They also have ambitions to 
add a TV channel.  
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The establishment of such online media networks has been largely in response to the dramatic 
socio-political circumstances affecting the Ezidi community, while the existence of new media 
technology has provided a platform.  According to Hayri Demir, Chief-Editor at EzidiPress, “The 
need for fast communication is increasing and will be ultimately necessary for the survival of the 
Ezidis.”xvii These networks are serving the function of supporting them in assimilating in their new 
nations but also preserving their cultural and religious heritage. It also demonstrates an 
assertiveness. It is worth noting here that although the term Ezidi is not common in English usage 
I have used it in this article as a response to interviews with several Ezidi activists who argue that 
the term Ezidi is more accurate. This seems to be an illustration of a new assertive attitude among 
Ezidis who are taking agency over their representation internationally as a result of the dramatic 
change in the socio-political situation. This change has also caused Ezidis to react and to adopt a 
media strategy through using online media to raise their profile, both transnationally among the 
growing Ezidi diaspora and globally among the international community.   
 
While the change in circumstances has accelerated this, it has been able to grow so quickly because 
of the existence of new media technologies and in particular social media, leading to greater 
decentralization. (Ginsburg 1991: 96) Ezidi diasporic media is led largely by young activists. In the 
Coptic case, the church developed a strong diaspora media network based on its experience with 
producing Coptic media in Egypt and has thereby retained authority in the diaspora.  This contrasts 
with the way that young Ezidi activists employing new media and international activism and 
discourses have become the most vocal leaders of Ezidi diasporic media. Alongside Ezidi media 
there has also been the establishment of NGOs such as Yazda and Yezidis International, both 
founded in 2014.  Due to the difference in the formation of diasporic media and the differences 
in those leading its development, Ezidi media aligned itself more quickly and easily with global 
media flows beyond the community and from the beginning sought to intersect Ezidi media with 
international rights discourses as a central aspect of efforts to use media to publicize the 
community’s concerns and to seek protection and preservation of the community. 
 
Terror and the Politics of Genocide Recognition:  
Copts and Ezidis in Global Media Since 2013/4 
The discussion so far has sought to illustrate that a variety of political, historical and technological 
factors have contributed to shaping the use of media of by minorities, indigenous peoples, or 
communities marginalized at the national level.  The case studies presented here show some 
commonalities with shifts identified in indigenous media scholarship in recent years.  However, 
there seems to have been less engagement of community media in the national public space than 
might be expected considering this scholarship.  In the Coptic case, the national public narratives 
of national unity supported by the state and the church leadership, are promoted through 
particularistic media and publicly as the most appropriate mechanism though which to achieve 
inclusion.  In the Ezidi case, the more clearly divided nature of society into often territorially 
compact groups, the dynamics of power operating between Ezidis and Kurdish authorities and 
the traditional stance of remaining generally aloof from the politics of the national government, 
also contributed to a lack of strong media engagement and advocacy at the national level. This will 
be further unpacked here through an examination of shifts in Coptic media initiated by the 2011 
uprising and through the global campaign for genocide recognition since 2014 that is the focus of 
diasporic Ezidi media.   
 
Immediately after the January 25 uprising of 2011, there was increased visibility of discourses and 
campaigns calling for improved Coptic rights in the Egyptian national context. Part of this climate 
was an increased willingness of Copts to bypass the traditional spokesmen, who are generally 
drawn from the church leadership. There were already some signs of dissent between Copts and 
the church over their status in the nation. In 2010, Coptic leaders in Egypt were unable to contain 
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the anger of Copts towards the government after it halted the building of a church in Giza in 
November 2010. Copts also expressed their anger publicly in the wake of the bombing of al-
Qidissayn Church in Alexandria on 1 January 2011. (Monier 2012) This sense of frustration was 
part of the national climate at this point just prior to the uprising that began on 25 January 2011, 
in which Copts participated fully as Egyptian citizens.  It appeared that the uprising presented an 
opportunity for Copts to overcome some marginalization effects, leading them to seize public 
spaces to increase their visibility in the national public sphere and their concerns about their ability 
to act as full and equal citizens.   However, in the ensuing instability and atmosphere of lawlessness 
that heightened the atmosphere of general insecurity, (Tadros 2015; Falk 2016) Egyptian national 
media began to adopt a narrative of ‘factional interests’ in referring to the demands of Copts and 
contrasted them with ‘Egyptian interests’ which had to take priority over those of Copts, as if they 
were mutually exclusive. (Monier 2012) This seemed to reinforce a sense that Copts are located 
on the periphery of the nation and, to a great extent, Egypt then witnessed a return to Coptic 
interests being expressed at the national level through voices sanctioned by the church.   
 
With this failure to maintain a place for Coptic advocacy in the public sphere within Egypt, Coptic 
diasporic spaces took on a renewed importance and some (community-authorized) Coptic figures 
have increasingly been speaking out about the targeting of Copts. They tend to balance this with 
a parallel focus on supporting the Egyptian government’s efforts to tackle terrorism. Two bishops 
that have become increasingly visible in international and social media are Bishop Suriel, Coptic 
Orthodox Bishop of Melbourne (see Saad and Westbrook 2016) and Bishop Angaelos, General 
Bishop of the Coptic Orthodox Church in the United Kingdom.  My analysis of their contributions 
to global and social media on the topic of the persecution of Middle Eastern Christians, reveals 
that both have begun to increasingly comment on this issue since 2011.  Prior to 2011, neither 
commented significantly on this issue and most mentions were made within community media, 
particularly diaspora websites such as www.lacopts.org, and usually referring to the historic period 
of persecution of Copts under the Emperor Diocletian in the third and fourth centuries; a period 
that still holds significance for contemporary Coptic identity as the age of martyrs and the start of 
the Coptic calendar. (Heo 2013) However, from 2011 both bishops have spoken increasingly to 
the media on the issue of persecution. This is still often within the spaces of community media 
but also expands to Christian media more broadly.xviii From 2013 onwards these contributions, in 
the form of articles, social media posts, tweets, and interviews with global and national news 
channels, increased significantly.  
 
The significance of this increased media presence from 2013 over 2011 is twofold.  Although this 
is two years after the uprising, it is 2013 when the Muslim Brotherhood president Mohammed 
Morsi is ousted and replaced by Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, a figure supported from the beginning by the 
Coptic Patriarch. (Guirguis, 2016: 96)  This change allayed some fears Copts had about the security 
of their status in Egypt under a Muslim Brotherhood government and they also saw in al-Sisi a 
symbol of hope for the realization of a culture of full equal citizenship.xix (Monier 2012) This 
reduced concerns about the impact of discussing issues related to Copts in global media on the 
security of Christians inside Egypt.  Another element of this change was that fighting international 
terrorism, symbolized by the Muslim Brotherhood, became a central narrative for the government. 
(Monier and Ranko 2013) The campaign against the Brotherhood was constructed as a global one 
that Egypt was fighting on behalf of international society and Copts were able to frame their safety 
in Egypt as part of this fight against terrorism. Therefore, highlighting the suffering of Christians 
globally served to underline the legitimacy of the Egyptian government’s stance against the 
Brotherhood and terrorism more generally.  
 
A new dynamic was added in 2015 when 21 Copts were murdered by IS affiliates in Libya and in 
2017 when IS declared that Copts had become a major target for attacks. (Tadros 2017) This lead 
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to an intersection of interests between Egyptian, Coptic and global interests against the brutality 
of IS.  This has also led to the usage of the term ‘genocide’ to describe what is happening to 
Christians in the Middle Eastxx and Bishop Angaelos was a vocal member of a campaign for IS's 
atrocities against Christians and Ezidis to be termed a genocide by the US congress.  It is important 
to note that he speaks of a genocide against Middle Eastern Christians and Ezidis and not just 
Copts, because he is representing this as a global issue beyond borders and not a localized Coptic 
or Egyptian problem.xxi 
 
In this way, these new interactions with global media and politics answer the dilemma of how to 
highlight the problems faced by Copts in Egypt through the media without threatening the status 
quo in relations between the church and the government and leading to increased difficulties for 
Christians in Egypt. The emergence of the discourse of the Egyptian government and people 
united against the terrorist threat means that Copts can more easily highlight the violence 
perpetrated against them publicly, while reducing the risk of being accused of betraying the 
Egyptian nation. By increasing the visibility of Copts through interactions between Coptic leaders 
and global media, the community is taking an increasingly pro-active stance, which is still very 
balanced with Egyptian patriotism and supporting Egyptian national sovereignty.  Although Copts 
are engaging with the media on the subject of the attacks against their community by tapping into 
global discourses, they continue to hold to their historic stance that the protection of Copts is to 
be found in their Egyptian citizenship, not outside interference. (Labib 2004) In this sense, Copts 
are not bypassing the nation in doing this but are actually seeking to reinforce national unity 
narratives and calls to strengthen the culture of citizenship. Conducting this advocacy from the 
international level avoids risking the pact of cooperation between church and state established 
between Shenouda and Mubarak and that has been reinforced under al-Sisi and Tawadros. (Tadros 
2013; Iskander 2012a; MacCallum 2010) It also avoids the marginalizing accusations of factional 
interests that raising issues of Coptic rights directly at national level has provoked. 
 
In contrast, diaspora Ezidis are bypassing the national level more explicitly by engaging in calls for 
direct international protection and raising the possibility of an autonomous area for either Ezidis 
alone or for Iraqi Christians and Ezidis together. Genocide recognition can act to strengthen the 
claims for this. (Baser and Toivanen 2017) It also taps into Ezidi community memories of repeated 
historical attempts to commit genocides against them, as well as the more widely known genocide 
discourses central to Armenian and Assyrian identity politics (see Atto 2016; Paul 2000). This is 
perhaps a natural reaction to the incredibly brutal violence committed by IS against Ezidis. IS 
entered Mosul in June 2014, giving the Christian majority there a choice of converting to Islam, 
paying Jizya,xxii leaving immediately or being put to death.  Less than two months later, IS moved 
on to the Ezidi stronghold of Sinjar and the surrounding areas.  As a result, thousands were killed 
or taken into slavery, while many more fled the area.  This has significantly altered the dynamics 
of the community in a short period of time.  It has also generated a significant amount of distrust 
and insecurity. Many do not believe that the Iraqi nation or the KRG can provide them security 
or eradicate the experience of marginalization and persecution that Ezidis have faced historically, 
in fact some activists argue that these governments are helping to create the conditions for an 
Ezidi genocide.xxiii  
 
This lack of trust in the national and regional authorities has pushed some Ezidi activists to seek 
solutions globally by reaching out to international activists and raising their voices through global 
media. To gain resonance these activists realize that their narratives need to be picked up by 
mainstream global media to achieve maximum impact. (Thorsen et al 2015: 3) Genocide 
recognition has been successfully employed to achieve visibility and impact. Using this discourse, 
the Ezidi community has begun to challenge the international community to protect it. Intersecting 
with global media, providing the Ezidi perspective on events and making the community more 
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visible have all been central to this strategy.  Nadia Murad, who was appointed a UN Goodwill 
Ambassador in September 2016, has become a symbol of the community through representing 
Ezidis on media and political platforms. Her high profile and cooperation with lawyer Amal 
Clooney contributed to the case for the UN officially designating the violence against Ezidis as a 
genocide, a key development in the contemporary identity construction of the community and in 
connecting the persecution of Ezidis with international civil society. (Appadurai 1996: 3)   
 
For many of the activists that have emerged from this current crisis, standing before a global 
audience to raise awareness about the Ezidi community now appears to be the only way to 
achieve security for Ezidis in Iraq, or failing that to call for asylum to be granted to Ezidis 
outside of the Middle East region. The aims are similar to those of traditional community media; 
to preserve and protect a community whose security and heritage are at risk. But they are using 
the new tools available to them, very much including new and global media, in order to ensure 
the interests of the community are intersecting with international civil society and international 
politics. The joining of Coptic diaspora leaders with Ezidis in the discourse of recognizing the 
violence against Middle Eastern Christians and Ezidis as a genocide is a demonstration of how 
these case studies align with scholarship on indigenous media and global communication that 
points to the trend in collective engagement at the global level (see Landzelius 2006). As Alia 
(2010: 7) describes, "some of the world’s least powerful people … are using radio, television, print 
and a range of new media to amplify their voices, extend the range of reception and expand their 
collective power."  On Nadia Murad’s personal website, she states that her mission is ‘to be a global 
voice for survivors.’xxiv This non-specific reference to survivors illustrates how media is being used 
in universalising the suffering of a group to expand collective power beyond national borders. At 
the same time as seeking collective solidarity, this activism seeks a solution that should be 
implemented in the specific local or national context of the community in order to secure the 
survival of its own particularistic identity. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has considered how the political climate of insecurity post-2011 (see Monier 2015) has 
lead marginalized/minority communities in the Middle East to change their media practices and 
priorities. Both communities had been using particularistic media in the homeland and diaspora to 
serve the internal needs of the community, such as transmission of heritage and socialization into 
community identity and cultural and religious practices. However, increased migration, instability 
and persecution in traditional homelands have resulted in the development of media strategies that 
support the community through engaging with global media to make the community’s fears and 
problems visible beyond national or community boundaries. The central purpose of this is to 
secure community survival by speaking to issues of both local and global concern, resulting in the 
amplification of the community’s voice.  The exact messages, the way they are circulated and by 
whom have been shaped by the prevailing identity politics of the community in terms of its 
conceptions of national belonging and its strategy for long-term survival in its local context.   
 
In the case of the Ezidis the threat to survival has been severe, forcing it to seek direct protection 
outside the nation from the international community. Some activists also call for an autonomous 
region for Ezidis centred on their traditional territories in northern Iraq. Central to this new 
engagement in global media and activism is the campaign to recognize the violence against Ezidis 
since 2014 as a genocide.  In contrast, although the Copts have been reluctant to highlight issues 
of discrimination for fear of undermining their stance rejecting the minority term and any need 
for foreign protection, the threat of IS has altered their engagement with media to play a role in 
shaping responses to the terrorists that are targeting their community in Egypt. However, they do 
not seek help as an endangered minority but call for international support for the Egyptian nation 
and Egyptian people in countering terrorism worldwide. Additionally, there is the emerging 
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discourse, especially promoted by Bishops Angaleos and Suriel, of including Copts in a global 
campaign to treat the violence against Christians and Ezidis across the region as a genocide. Again, 
Copts are not singled out as a minority and there are no calls for practical foreign intervention or 
for any kind of intervention in the Egyptian nation for an autonomous region for Copts, a concept 
that his historically deeply distasteful for Copts.  
 
These differences are partly to do with the different dynamics of the communities in their national 
context and partly to do with the different circumstances of the attacks against them to date. But 
through the pressures of socio-political upheaval and via the platforms offered by new media 
technology, both Coptic and Ezidi figures are increasingly interacting with international civil 
society and global media flows.  In this way, both groups seek highlight the intersections between 
their issues and global political interests. Appealing to the concept of universal human rights 
discourses, and in particular of genocide, Copts and Ezidis are able to engage directly in the 
challenges that threaten their status or act as obstacles to full inclusion, albeit it to different degrees, 
at the national level.  In both cases, the eventual aim is to secure the survival of their community 
and protection of their specific culture and identity. While Copts seek to achieve this by reinforcing 
Egyptian national belonging, some Ezidis have lost faith in the Iraqi national government and see 
their best hope for the future is in a secured Ezidi region in Iraq.  The politics of national belonging 
is thereby central in understanding the shifts in media usage and the reasons why activists and 
community leaders have adopted certain discourses in their engagement with global media flows. 
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